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I. Introduction
Daniel Martin has, in his Note Dispersing the Cloud, 1 seized
on an important and symbolic stick from the traditional property
bundle. By showing the vicissitudes the right to destroy has
suffered in the transition from Roman to common to modern law, 2
Martin offers us a useful roadmap for the slowly shifting powers
we take for granted over what is ours and demonstrates a way
forward for one of the oldest of them.
Consumers should have a right to digital destruction for a
range of reasons. First, it is a good idea because the power to
destroy is highly symbolic. We have long given up Blackstone’s
* Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law.
1. Daniel Martin, Note, Dispersing the Cloud: Reaffirming the Right to
Destroy in a New Era of Digital Property, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 467 (2017).
2. See id. at 8–19 (tracing the history of the right to destroy).
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“sole and despotic dominion,” 3 but it is useful to be reminded of
the important sense behind that ringing call to battle: that the
owner should be permitted to do what she likes with what is hers,
insofar as the legal regime can tolerate it. That message is an
important one now, when we do not control—and therefore do not
own in any recognizable meaning of the term—our smartphones,
smart television sets, smart homes, or smart cars. 4
Second, there is also a deeply practical element to Martin’s
theory. His argument that digital intangibles can be destroyed is,
alone, important. 5 The received wisdom is that destruction of
digital intangibles is simply too hard, given the nature of
information technology and the characteristics of information
itself. I will try to show in this brief comment that the naysayers
have been too quick off the mark. There are certainly difficulties
in securing destruction of information-based property, largely
because the transaction costs of copying are so low that computer
systems make large numbers of copies purely to function. But the
very same systems that are making rivalrous 6 digital property
possible make an owner’s real power of permanent destruction
feasible.
II. Theorizing Destruction
A. Destruction as Guarantor of Property Rules
One core contribution Martin makes to the theory of
destruction is to draw attention toward alternative motives for
exercising the right to destroy. Courts are skeptical of destruction
3.
4.

2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2.
See JOSHUA A.T. FAIRFIELD, OWNED: PROPERTY, PRIVACY, AND THE NEW
DIGITAL SERFDOM (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 2) (on file with author)
(“We own and control fewer and fewer of the products that we must use to
function in modern society.”).
5. See Martin, supra note 1, at 52–55 (addressing the “the question [of]
whether cloud-maintained digital property is even capable of deletion”).
6. “Rivalry is the inherent characteristic of traditional property that limits
control of the property, at any given time, to one person . . . . Intangible
rivalrous property, such as an email address, is an example of virtual property.
By appropriating an email address for personal use, the user excludes others
from using it.” Charles Blazer, The Five Indicia of Virtual Property, 5 PIERCE L.
REV. 137, 143 (2006).

APPETITE FOR DESTRUCTION

541

of scarce resources for spite’s sake. 7 Perhaps, Martin theorizes,
courts might be more open to the destruction of non-scarce (but
still rivalrous) resources for the purpose of securing the owner’s
peace of mind. 8 The question is whether there are other
motivations for destruction that might resonate with courts that
fall closer to Martin’s peace of mind theory on the spectrum than
to the spiteful destruction of scarce resources.
The game theoretic thrust of destruction is that it
disincentivizes attempts to seize the asset against the will of the
owner through some form of liability rule 9 or outright theft.
Consider the archetypal game of chicken: “Two hooligans with
something to prove drive at each other on a narrow road. The
first to swerve loses faces among his peers. If neither swerves,
however, a terminal fate plagues both.” 10 One of the key moves is
to rip out the steering wheel—that is, to ensure that if the other
party continues on its path, there will be a crash. Technology can
serve as the precommitment strategy—the steering wheel
remover. This is the standard arrangement on an iPhone: if a
potential intruder continues on their course of action of guessing
wrong passwords, the phone will automatically delete the
encryption key, rendering the data inaccessible. 11 This strongly

7. See, e.g., Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co., 524 S.W.2d 210, 217 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1975) (finding that “senseless destruction serving no apparent good
purpose is to be held in disfavor”).
8. See Martin, supra note 1, at 35 (arguing that “peace of mind, certainty,
security—however one wishes to phrase it—is a fundamental aspect of property
law”).
9. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089,
1092 (1972) (“Whenever someone may destroy the initial entitlement if he is
willing to pay an objectively determined value for it, an entitlement is protected
by a liability rule.”).
THEORY.NET,
10. Mikhael
Shor,
Game
of
Chicken,
GAME
http://www.gametheory.net/Dictionary/Games/GameofChicken.html
(last
updated Sept. 1, 2006) (last visited Mar. 2, 2017) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
11. See Alina Selyukh & Camila Domonoske, Apple, The FBI and iPhone
Encryption: A Look at What’s at Stake, NPR (Feb. 16, 2016),
http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/02/17/467096705/apple-the-fbiand-iphone-encryption-a-look-at-whats-at-stake (last visited Mar. 2, 2017)
(describing the iPhone’s encryption system) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
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disincentivizes theft, as the technological encryption key wipes
out valuable data, denying the thief a large part of her gains.
In this sense, then, the power to destroy serves not just to
give the user peace of mind that data contained within a
destructible digital asset is gone forever, but a more robust peace
of mind: the idea that the asset will be destroyed rather than
involuntarily transferred, accessed, or used. It strikes me,
therefore, that destruction serves as a particularly effective
guarantor of property rules against liability rule attempts to seize
the asset. Consider the destruction of assets after death. Perhaps
the testator believes that the person who is attempting to acquire
the property is simply waiting for the testator’s death instead of
negotiating for the acquisition of the asset. A will with a
destruction clause in this context is not born from spite, but social
technology, an analog version of the iPhone’s digital “dead man’s
switch.” The effect of either is that it is much harder to
circumvent negotiating with the owner to access the asset by
waiting for her to die (in the case of a will) or trying to hack the
phone while out of the owner’s possession (in the iPhone’s case).
The relevant peace of mind is therefore peace from harassment
and intrusion for existing assets, as well as the peace that flows
from the permanent destruction of past assets. Of course, this
does not deal with the court’s opposition to the waste of
destroying scarce assets, but as the next section discusses, the
assets Martin discusses are often rivalrous, but not scarce.
B. Threading the Needle
Martin’s theory neatly threads the needle between scarcity
and rivalrousness. American courts have consistently disfavored
the right to destroy scarce resources, on grounds of waste. 12 If the
resources Martin references were truly scarce, then there is every
chance that courts would remain hostile to a right to destroy.
Digital resources, however, are often not scarce. For example,
it takes only a click of a mouse to generate a million extra copies
of the latest pop hit. This raises the other problem, though:
intellectual property issues aside, how can anything so easily
12. See Martin, supra note 1, at 13–15 (discussing cases in which courts
limit the right to destroy on the basis of waste).
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copyable be destroyed? Both computers as end nodes and
computers as connecting nodes of an informational network
operate solely on the basis of copying. Both technology and
economics drive the massive redundancy of digital resources.
Computers convey information by copying, retain copies to verify
transmission, backup copies to insure against failure, and, most
importantly in the data economy, gather and sell enormous and
evolving user datasets as the primary method for monetizing
internet services.
To thread the needle, it is useful to note that there are
emerging classes of rivalrous, non-scarce assets. This is most
clearly seen in the license server model. Consider 1,000 copies of
a digital asset, whether a game, an MP3, or a unit of a digital
currency. One centralized server can keep a list of who owns
what, and if we use the Bitcoin blockchain protocol—which we’ll
talk about below—we don’t even need a centralized server. If my
specific digital copy is copy #547, then it does not matter whether
it can be duplicated. That copy #547 is linked to a database in the
server, and if that particular copy is duplicated, then the server
will know that the second linked copy is illegitimate. Similarly,
the mechanisms of rivalrousness provide the means of effective
destruction. If the license server terminates the entry, then copy
#547 is no longer a legitimate copy. That is not total destruction,
but combined with encryption and the storage of some resources
on the server (so that the client asset, once de-linked, is useless),
we can use the emerging technology of digital rivalrousness to
effect digital destruction.
Bitcoins are a prime example of this sort of technology.
Bitcoins, of course, are intangible, mere entries in a decentralized
database called the blockchain. 13 Because these entries on the
blockchain are secured by encryption, then only a person with a
specific encryption key can access or transfer a Bitcoin. 14 If that
encryption key is lost or deleted, the Bitcoin is permanently lost.
This is called “burning” in the Bitcoin community, 15 and made for
13. See Joshua A.T. Fairfield, BitProperty, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 805, 814
(2015) (describing Bitcoins and the blockchain technology).
14. See id. at 820 (“Each person within the property system has a pair of
cryptographically related keys, one public, given to everyone in the world to use,
and one private, held only by the individual.”).
15. See Antoine Le Calvez, How to Destroy Bitcoins, MEDIUM (Nov. 16,
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some of the most compelling early stories. One Bitcoin user threw
out the hard drive on which his Bitcoins (or, more accurately, the
encryption keys that validated his ability to transfer them) were
stored, and the hard drive went to the landfill. 16 He lost $7.5
million worth of Bitcoin as surely as if he had converted them to
cash and burned it. 17
Another example comes from the virtual community Eve
Online, a massively multiplayer online science fiction game
where players can exchange real dollars for virtual objects (and
vice versa) and engage in virtual battles that therefore cost real
money in terms of virtual objects destroyed. One battle saw the
destruction of over $200,000 worth of virtual spaceships and
equipment. 18 All questions about why players value video game
objects at thousands of dollars aside, the mechanisms of
rivalrousness enabled the destruction of those ships. The game
provider keeps track of which assets are connected to which
accounts. When a ship is destroyed, the data entry is changed,
and the player no longer has that ship within the game.
For intellectual property, the problem is the nature of
intellectual property itself. Judge Posner noted that the
difference between personal and intellectual property is the
marginal cost of creation. 19 For personal or real property, the
marginal cost of creation does not go down. Manufacturing the
nth computer costs about as much as manufacturing the n+1st.
But making the first recording of a new song has a vastly
2015), https://medium.com/@alcio/how-to-destroy-Bitcoins-255bb6f2142e#.erj44
cdsd (last visited Mar. 2, 2017) (“Burning Bitcoins is making them
unspendable.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
16. Alexander Smith, IT Worker Throws Out Hard Drive, Loses $7.5
Million Bitcoin Fortune, NBC NEWS (Nov. 29, 2013, 7:57 AM),
www.nbcnews.com/news/other/it-worker-throws-out-hard-drive-loses-7-5million-f2D11669738 (last visited Mar. 2, 2017) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
17. Id.
18. Rich McCormick, Spaceships Worth More Than $200,000 Destroyed in
Biggest
Virtual
Space
Battle
Ever,
VERGE
(Jan.
29,
2014),
www.theverge.com/2014/1/29/5356498/eve-online-battle-sees-200000-dollarsworth-of-spaceships-destroyed (last visited Mar. 2, 2017) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
19. See Richard A. Posner, Intellectual Property: The Law and Economics
Approach, 19 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 57, 62–64 (2005) (discussing the
transaction costs of intellectual property).
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different cost than copy-pasting the MP3 once it has been
recorded. Of course, manufacturing brings economies of scale,
and 3D printing perhaps brings lower marginal costs to physical
duplicates without such economies, but the marginal cost of
duplicating intellectual property is so close to zero that even the
lowest marginal costs of producing personal property cannot come
close.
Martin does not differentiate between the categories of
emerging rivalrous intangible property and non-rivalrous
intellectual property. His cloud examples contain elements of
each, with an additional element of personal interest. 20 At several
points he makes his strongest argument, which is that at least
digital property originating from the self should be subject to the
right to destroy. 21 That’s clever, and provides a potential bridge
between European jurisprudence, where a right to delete is taken
seriously, and American jurisprudence, where property intuitions
are stronger than privacy intuitions.
So, to what shall we apply this right to destroy? If it is to
smart property, the ability to destroy proceeds from the
physicality of the linked hardware. If to intangible personal
property—not intellectual property—then we must distinguish
between intangible property that is rivalrous and intangible
property that isn’t. That difference is important because we will
be able to use the systems set up to make a digital thing unique
to be able to destroy it. Non-rivalrous digital property comes close
to intellectual property, where we have our greatest difficulties.
Here the problem is the raw multiplicity of copies that propagate
throughout a system. That, combined with the fact that most
information technology systems are almost fiendishly designed to
retain duplicates of information, means that the right to destroy
could turn into a game of whack-a-mole.
Martin references “the cloud,” but just as quickly notes that
nobody knows what that is. 22 In the case of digital property, the
cloud includes two models that have quite different impacts on
20. See Martin, supra note 1, at 19–29 (discussing digital property
managed via cloud storage services).
21. See id. at 5–7 (discussing the hypothetical example of a photographer
attempting to delete her digital, cloud-maintained photo file).
22. See id. at 24 (“What is the cloud? Even among industry experts, the
answer to that question is up in the air.”).
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the theory he proposes. The first is that the cloud might operate
on a license server model. This is an attempt to make the digital
assets unique by linking them to a register. The second is that
the cloud might operate on a backup model. Here, the goal is to
enable the computer to recover from nearly any failure by saving
and backing up the data as much as possible. Of course, the two
can work together, with redundancy serving as the backup to the
license server information. But in a legal sense, the two operate
quite differently: the license server model lends itself to personal
property descriptions. The redundancy model more closely tracks
discussions of intellectual property.
Are the differentiations useful? Should we describe a new
property form (pace Henry Smith and Tom Merrill’s Numerus
Clausus) 23 that somehow captures the emerging consensus
around intangible personal property? Or are the concerns about
control and finality that Martin describes universal to both
intellectual and intangible personal property?
I believe that there is value in distinguishing between
intellectual property and intangible personal property, largely
because my personal academic project is the recognition of
consumer interests in the software, digital assets, and virtual
objects that they purchase. The value in continuing to conflate
intellectual and intangible personal property is that it would
permit users who have some sort of origination right to their data
to exercise intellectual property controls, including the right to
deny use of that data to anyone else.
C. Privacy, Property, and Origination
This, then, is the core of Martin’s argument, as applied to
data that originates in an individual. Traditional property rights
give a right to destroy. People wish that certain data about them
could be destroyed. Some of that data is held in digital objects,
like Google Docs, that are the spiritual successors to papers that
would have traditionally been deemed personal property.
American courts have been liberal in granting citizens property
remedies, including the very easy remedy of not doing anything
23. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the
Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000).
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to disturb the owner’s decision to delete or destroy. Martin’s
example of the “Will it Blend?” video series is instructive. 24 No
matter how troubled the right to destroy may be in terms of a
testator’s right to burn down her house after her death, it is quite
improbable that destruction of an iPhone would generate any
form of legal liability.
There is no question that a right of ultimate disposition—a
right to destroy—would help with the project of protecting
personal data. The difficulty is that it involves odd contours in
the law of property. We have never propertized data. Facts are
neither owned as a matter of intellectual property, nor considered
personal property. The confusion stems from the fact that some
data used to be contained within personal property, and the
destruction of the personal property entailed the destruction of
the data.
III. Operationalizing Destruction
It is my contention that the difference between raw unowned
factual data, intellectual property, and rivalrous intangible
personal property has significant explanatory power over our
ability to actually destroy cloud-stored intangibles. Intellectual
property, like other forms of data, can only be destroyed if
encrypted. Intangible personal property (which, somewhat
confusingly, can include specific copies of copyrighted material)
has the additional advantage of being able to leverage the
mechanisms of rivalrousness to functionally destroy the digital
artifact.
A. Encryption
Even if data itself is not property, the digital boxes that
contain it might be. And those boxes can be destroyed. Consider,
for example, best practices for data stored with a cloud provider,
like DropBox, that may release the information to parties without
24. See Martin, supra note 1, at 2–3 (discussing an advertising series that
literally blends “unconventional items, from toy cars to cans of soup” to, in one
feature, an iPhone).
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the data originator’s consent (in the case of DropBox, most
commonly in response to a warrant or administrative
subpoena). 25 Users can create encrypted volumes with the cloud
provider, making it impossible for the cloud provider to disclose
the data. Insofar as the data remains within the encrypted
volume, it is subject to destruction. Just as the owner of a Bitcoin
can delete the encryption key that permits her to access or
transfer Bitcoins, so the owner of an encrypted volume can delete
the encryption, irreversibly wiping the contents.
Recall the incident in which the FBI wished to enter one of
the San Bernadino shooters’ iPhones. 26 The data within the
phone was encrypted, and Apple did not have the encryption
key. 27 The FBI attempted to pressure Apple into using its
software distribution network to accept malware as an
over-the-air update, which would disable the encryption
function. 28 The point here is that the FBI needed a back door
because it could not get through the walls. The risk in that case
was that after a limited number of password guesses, the phone
would erase itself, or, more precisely, erase the encryption key
used to access the phone’s contents. 29 Without that tiny bit of
information, no known technology can recover the data.
That is destruction of data, complete and irreversible. Of
course, the data has to be within an encrypted container, but that
is not difficult to manage. In a way, the encrypted container
method of destruction works particularly well for the cloud
services model. It permits the data to be remotely accessed and
stored, and even to be backed up (in encrypted form) by the cloud
services provider. Once the key is gone, however, the encrypted
data is inaccessible for good, no matter where stored or how many
times it has been backed up or copied.

25. See BRUCE SCHNEIER, DATA AND GOLIATH 67 (2015) (describing how law
enforcement agencies such as the FBI obtain information from third parties
such as Dropbox).
26. See Selyukh & Domonoske, supra note 11 (discussing the incident).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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B. Leveraging Rivalrousness
The second component of operationalizing a right to destroy
will be to use the systems of rivalrousness that currently govern
intangible property. This method will of course only work for
those systems for which managed rivalrousness matters. The
example of an MP3 is instructive. An MP3 may be tracked by a
license server, and if it is, then destruction of the link between
the MP3 and the license server will have an effect. Consider one
older DRM model under which some songs were not playable
unless the license server indicated that the user’s copy checked
out. (Nothing in this Comment promotes such DRM licenseserver models. I merely note that it is possible to use DRM
license-server models to operationalize destruction.) If the value
of the asset is that it remains linked to the central list of who
owns what, then the value of the digital asset can be destroyed by
de-linking it from the central list. Another example is a valuable
digital asset in a video game. The value of the asset is that it can
be used in a shared environment. If I have an awesome hat in
Team Fortress 2, others can see it and admire my sartorial skills
and presumed gaming prowess. The point is that the value of the
item is not in the pixel but in the network and social context in
which the item appears. It does me no good to have a piece of
valuable virtual personal property if there is no one to admire it.
Since the game creator’s central server, or the MP3 licensor’s
license server, dictates who has a legitimate copy of the asset, it
is possible to destroy assets by destroying the legitimacy of the
link. This is how a game company can destroy a valuable weapon
in a game, even though the resource, the code for the sword, still
resides on the user’s computer. And nobody cares how many
times the pixels are drawn, erased, and redrawn. Those are not
the essence of the digital property. The essence of the digital
property lies in the legitimacy of its appearance within the game.
By de-linking the asset, it no longer appears in a game
character’s inventory. By de-linking a downloaded game, it is no
longer available in a buyer’s Steam library. By de-linking a book,
it is no longer available in the user’s Kindle collection. By
de-linking an iTunes song, it is no longer available in the iTunes
library. And so on.
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The key here is that the legitimacy of the asset is
destructible. With legitimacy comes convenience. It very
convenient to download an asset once one has legally purchased
it. Illegally obtaining and accessing software, music, or even
hacked versions of networked assets like equipment within a
game is costlier in terms of time and effort. Note that I do not
claim it is impossible to obtain illegitimate copies, or even
particularly difficult. But small transaction costs have large
effects on low-value, high-volume transactions. Buying a Kindle
is simply easier than trying to download a million ebooks from
the Pirate Bay.
IV. Conclusion
Martin’s take on destruction divorces the debate from the
American-frontier focus on preserving scarce resources against
waste. It also creates a fascinating space between rivalrousness
and scarcity, in which courts may be willing to enforce a right to
destroy where there is no waste, and those rights are practically
enforceable because the technological systems that undergird
digital rivalrousness. For instance, destroying the data on an
iPhone or a blockchain entry might be supported by courts
because it is not waste, and is enforceable as a practical matter
because of container encryption and distributed ledger
technology.
The practical effects of a strengthened theory of destruction
also lead to a deepening of Martin’s theory of peace of mind.
Peace of mind in the more constrained sense relates to being sure
that data, once deleted, is gone. That’s a hard row to hoe, given
the redundancy of information processing systems. A deeper
peace of mind might relate less to the final and total deletion of
information and more to the incentives potential expropriators
might have to circumvent negotiation with the owner.

